“The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran sets forth the cultural, social, political and economic institutions of the people of Iran, based on Islamic principles and rules, and reflecting the fundamental desires of the Islamic people.”

It is not a surprise that the Iranian constitution should, even in its first sentence, proclaim its devotion to Islam, given the known marriage of government and religion in Iran. The surprise is rather in the Iranian political system, which seems to make a show of its democratic elements while leaning heavily on its theocracy. This creates a system of circuitous and conflicting powers.

Case in point: Current president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, famous for denying the Holocaust and proposing the movement of Israel to Alaska, was preceded by Mohammad Khatami of the Iranian Reformist movement. President Khatami was elected by 70 percent of the popular vote and re-elected by 78 percent but spent his terms in office battling with Iran’s fundamentalist supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The president is charged with upholding the constitution, but media, judicial and military powers are conferred on the supreme leader. The supreme leader also appoints six theologians to the Guardian Council, which is the most conservative body within the system and the most powerful. The Guardian Council ensures that all bills passed by Parliament abide by strict Islamic rules and, most startlingly, have the ability to veto parliamentary and presidential candidates.
The concentration of power in these two arms of government, the Guardian Council and the supreme leader, undermines the Reformist tendencies of the Iranian Parliament (directly elected every four years) and the president. Neither supreme leaders nor Guardian Council members are elected directly.

In addition to these offices of Parliament, president, supreme leader, and Guardian Council, there is the Cabinet, composed of ministers appointed by the president who are often loyal instead to the supreme leader, and the Assembly of Experts, who are directly elected and supposedly oversee the function of the supreme leader, but are also criticized for their passivity in their duties and loyalty to the supreme leader.

The most interesting aspect of this system to me, novice political observer that I am, is that the election of former President Khatami was in part due to the vast numbers of youth and women. These groups are among those pushing for reform. The idea that a reformist president could be elected is at once encouraging, signifying that perhaps change is possible, even in theocracies dominated by non-elected wielders of immense power. Or is it the opposite? Is the possibility of President Khatmai’s election merely a means of placating reformists with symbolic offices absent of real power?